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Deliberate forgetting, like deliber-
ate remembering (in museums, 
in monuments, in public com-
memorations) is an integral part 
of political memory and, indeed, 
in our everyday lives. It is human 
nature to omit parts of our past, or 
to relegate them behind carefully 
constructed narrative frameworks 
that avoid excessive scrutiny.
The imperial and colonial past of 
the United States of America is one 
such example of this institutional 
amnesia and would explain Don-
ald Rumsfeld’s petulant declara-
tion in April 2003 that “we don’t 
seek empires … we’re not imperi-
alistic, we never have been.” Rums-
feld was not particularly in conver-
sation with history when he made 
his statement. He was responding, 
perhaps, to the long list of jour-
nalists, academics, public-policy 
thinkers and government employ-
ees who argued America should 
embrace its already-present em-
pire. An early, and forceful voice, 
was Niall Ferguson, an economic 
historian, who penned in October 
31, 2001 an opinion piece enti-
tled Welcome the new imperialism 
which urged a similar burden onto 
the United States. The “new”, how-
ever, is rather galling.
Starting from the Declaration of 
Independence in 1776, the conti-
nental spread of America towards 
the Pacific is deemed neither colo-
nial nor particularly imperialistic. 
It is the conflicts with European 
powers – French, Spain and Eng-
land – that frame that particular 
version of the past. Manifest Des-
tiny (“to overspread the continent 
allotted by Providence for the free 
development of our yearly multi-
plying millions” as described in 
1845), once specifically articulated 
in the 1840s, was abundantly real-
ised in the annexations of Texas, 
Kansas, and California. Expan-
sion, commerce, some notion of 
“popular sovereignty principle”, 
were clearly marked in the open-
ing up of the seas beyond the con-
tinent. 
Furthermore, the 1856 Guano 
Islands Act claimed for the Unit-
ed States any “unclaimed” island 
with sufficient supplies of bird 
waste (to be used as fertiliser by 
American farmers) by any Ameri-
can entrepreneur, and this annex-
ation would be defended by the US 
Navy. The list of island territories 
annexed, claimed or contested – 
Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, Hawaii, 
the Philippines, etc – is long and 
scattered around the globe.
The last of these, the Philippines 
and the Spanish-American War 
in 1898 is one particularly glaring 
omission in American historical 
memory. It was to mark, and urge 
towards, a global colonial strat-
egy for the United States that the 
“old India hand” Rudyard Kipling 
penned his The White Man’s Bur-
den: United States and the Philip-
pine Islands (1898) and sent it di-
rectly to Theodore Roosevelt, then 
the governor of New York.
The “silent, sullen peoples” – 
who await salvation from bond-
age, freedom from the iron rule 
of kings – watch with trepidation 
and with hope the march of the 
American imperial might (“The 
ports ye shall not enter / the roads 
ye shall not tread / Go, make them 
with your living / And mark them 
with your dead”). The Kipling in-
vocation to do empire better has 
lived on in other inheritors of 
that particular worldview, such 
as Ferguson. But Kipling himself, 
as a model of a citizen-journalist, 
firmly attuned to the greater glory 
and greater hubris of his own state, 
and committed to a deep knowl-
edge of the charges of his empire, 
is now forgotten. Kipling, born 
and employed in British India, was 
about to embark on a trip to the 
United States and possibly meant 
his poem to be his calling card. As 
a reporter for the Civil and Military 
Gazette in Lahore and Pioneer in 
Allahabad, he urged that his cri-
tiques of the failures of imperial 
strategies were based on his inti-
mate knowledge of India: “I met a 
hundred men on the road to Delhi 
and they were all my brothers” was 
t h e  e p i g r a p h  h e  c h o s e  f o r 
Life’s Handicap.
His many short stories, report-
age, travelogues were genuinely 
multilingual, multivocal and 
strove to present all the corrup-
tions and contradictions of his 
imperial age. Yet, he managed to 
always convey a singular vision of 
greater good – achievable only via 
a united empire – for the popula-
tions he called family and territo-
ries he called home, which were 
far away from London. That need 
to argue for a better strategy for 
empire meant, for Kipling, a deep 
involvement for those to whom the 
empire dictated. 
In Letters of Marque (1887) he 
contrasts the travelling “King 
of Loafers” who has an “unholy 
knowledge” of the natives via his 
life lived among them with the 
“Globe Trotters” who claim exper-
tise by staying in hotels and who 
produce nothing but banal obser-
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vations: “With rare and sparkling 
originality he remarked that India 
was a ‘big place,’ and that there 
were many things to buy.”
≥≥≥
Robert D Kaplan is an eminent 
globe-trotter. His list of previous 
publications puts him in Central 
Asia, Eastern Europe, South Ameri-
ca, West Africa, North Africa, South 
Asia and South-east Asia. He is also 
an eminent articulator for the need 
to do empire better. 
“Where’s the American empire 
when we need it?”, he asked in a 
long essay in the The Washington 
Post on December 3, 2010. A heart-
felt plea to not go gently into that 
good night (“The American em-
pire has always been more struc-
tural than spiritual”), Kaplan lo-
cates American imperial power as 
a magnetic pole – which attracts 
certain configurations and repels 
others. In his previous works like 
Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through 
History (1993), The Ends of the 
Earth: A Journey to the Frontiers of 
Anarchy (1996), and the most re-
cent Monsoon: The Indian Ocean 
and the Future of American Power 
(2010) the American empire ex-
ists mainly to thwart other anar-
chic forces – political, such as the 
Soviets, and maybe the Chinese; 
but mainly the historical, the geo-
graphical and ethnic.
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Kaplan argues for a new cartog-
raphy of empire – one that takes as 
its centre the Indian Ocean world. 
This configuration, which he holds 
was the key to the European colo-
nial hegemony, has fallen out of 
America’s strategic sights during 
the last half of the 20th century and 
the first decade of the new century. 
While America has focused on the 
Middle East or Central Asia, a new 
world order is emerging in the port 
sites of Oman, Yemen, Pakistan, In-
dia, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lan-
ka, Somalia, Zanzibar. This world 
order, which is a revival of medieval 
and early modern trade networks, 
is being financed by the Chinese, in 
a blatant effort to project soft power 
throughout the Indian Ocean (to 
become a “two-ocean” empire).
India is the only contender in this 
space, and as both of these emer-
gent world-powers divide up the 
ports, the supply routes, the fuel 
and tank depots, America will lurk 
uneasily in the background, despite 
having both aerial and naval supe-
riority. In this network, lies for Kap-
lan, the emergence of a new global 
class of African and Asian mer-
chants and consumers who are key 
to both military and civilisational 
domination. Kaplan argues that the 
struggle is not for military hegem-
ony between China and America, 
but a co-existence which emulates 
patterns of habitations that have 
been centuries in the making. To 
buttress his claim, Kaplan travels to 
ports and cities which feed into the 
Indian Ocean trade, and presents 
an uneasy mixture of academic 
analysis and first-person narrative.
Kaplan’s central thesis, of an In-
dian Ocean oikoumene comes 
largely from the work of historian 
Janet L Abu-Lughoud – whose 
Before European Hegemony: The 
World System AD 1250-1350 is 
cited numerous times and pro-
vides Kaplan with the bulwark of 
an Arab-Asian trading network 
across the Indian Ocean – and 
from the anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz – from whose nuanced Islam 
Observed: Religious Development in 
Morocco and Indonesia (1968) Kap-
lan emerges with the highly prob-
lematic dialectic “Desert Islam” 
versus “Tropical Islam”. Between 
these central texts, Kaplan repro-
duces in a prose both clunky and 
confused a wide array of secondary 
academic scholarship, academic 
talks, academics who talk to him, 
and policy and position papers.
The various contradictions and 
examples of ill-digested scholar-
ship that mark Kaplan’s pages can-
not truly be appreciated without re-
producing entire chunks of pages. 
To this reader, they appear not to 
be contradictions or confusions in 
Kaplan’s thought, but simply the 
efforts of a studious neophyte, ea-
ger to marshal everything he has 
read – and he has read everything 
– into the narrative. This makes for 
headache inducing; historical fact 
after political factoid after cultural 
stereotype constantly clashing on 
the page.
A more fruitful exercise would 
be to deal specifically with two 
intertwined thematic underpin-
nings of Monsoon: Geography and 
Civilisation.
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As Kaplan writes: “Geography 
rules”, “Geography encompasses”, 
we remain at the “mercy of geogra-
phy”. Geography also guides, dic-
tates, determines. It is impersonal, 
but “politics must follow geogra-
phy,” as does culture. Geography 
determines “national character.” 
The desert is one such manifesta-
tion of an over-determining geog-
raphy. The desert is dry, “unforgiv-
ing”, “violent”, “constricting”, gives 
its people “extremities of thought”, 
“chaotic”. As such, the desert not 
only contains such anthropomor-
phic qualities, it formulates them 
in those who come near it, or live 
in it – to provide a one-sentence 
summary, “Indeed, the deeper 
and broader the desert, potentially 
the more unstable and violent the 
state”. It is in this cradle that Islam 
is born.
He contrasts this with the world 
of the ocean. The ocean is wet, 
“encompassing”, “stimulating”, 
“a global agglomeration”, “cultur-
ally sophisticated”. It is when Is-
lam comes into contact with this 
geographical force that it develops 
from “desert Islam” to “tropical Is-
lam” – representing precisely the 
qualities which Kaplan imbues in 
the respective geographical fea-
tures. In its essentialising of diver-
sity, and diversification of essen-
tially material realities, Kaplan’s 
dichotomy – yes, the two Islams 
are at war with each other – beggars 
belief. Not to mention, it beggars 
geography. How exactly will he ex-
plain Egypt, one wonders.
He is misreading not only 
Geertz’s careful ethnographies of 
agrarian practices in Morocco and 
Indonesia, he is contradicting his 
own deeply held beliefs. Because, 
for Kaplan, geography isn’t really 
all that powerful. It must bow be-
fore the will of man. Now, granted 
in Kaplan’s reading only a hand-
ful of men – historically speak-
ing – have been capable enough 
to stand up to geography’s pre-
destination. These men, and the 
regimes they built, are fulsomely 
praised by Kaplan. These men 
have much in common: they are 
brutal, in thought and in acts, men 
of action and few words, men who 
make the right decision even at the 
cost of righteous moral claims.
These are men like Alfonso 
d’Alburuerque, the 16th-century 
Portuguese conqueror of the In-
dian Ocean; Robert Clive, the 
 18th-century governor of the East 
India Company and the conqueror 
of Bengal; the current Sultan Qabus 
of Oman, and the current President 
Mahinda Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka, 
as well as the faceless men who run 
China. Kaplan finds that such men, 
carved new destinies out of blood 
and sweat (mostly blood) for their 
historically afflicted regions and 
are to be praised, even emulated. 
After describing the horrors inflict-
ed by the Portuguese in their con-
quest of India, Kaplan concludes: 
“Indeed, there is much the United 
States can learn from the positive 
side of the Portuguese national 
character, with many Catholic con-
verts and the persistence of the Por-
tuguese language in places like Sri 
Lanka and the Maluccas”.
The most glaring lack, in Kap-
lan’s imagination for the empire, 
is ultimately his inability to actu-
ally know. The languages, the cus-
toms, the rhythms, the cultures 
of places he visits, from Oman to 
Gwadar, to Calcutta, to Dhaka, to 
Zanzibar remain out of his pur-
view. He makes a valiant effort to 
let historical writing, act as a sub-
stitute for his incomprehensibility 
of the present: “Here, along a coast 
so empty that you can almost hear 
the echo of the camel hooves of Al-
exander’s army, you lose yourself 
in geology.” He is often surprised 
(“Miniature donkeys emerg-
ing from the sea!”), often over-
whelmed (by the poverty ondisplay 
in Dhaka and in Zanzibar) and 
always dependent on others to ex-
plain to him, the significance of 
what he observes. The significance 
of what he does observe, and what 
he argues for in Monsoon is what 
is at stake for most readers of his 
book. Kaplan is, after all like Ki-
pling, offering prescriptives to the 
American empire, whether he con-
siders America an empire per se. 
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Kaplan forgets that America and 
Americans remain intimately in-
tertwined with lives in the Indian 
Ocean world. In its long-storied 
past – Elihu Yale, who founded 
Yale University –  the birth-place of 
American Indology was a governor 
of the East India Company; the opi-
um trade network which sustained 
the East India Company coffers in 
the mid-19th century – supplying 
Bengal raised opium to China - was 
remitted through American cotton. 
And in its tumultuous present – the 
drones which fly over Afghanistan 
and Pakistan dispensing justice, re-
portedly use bases in Balochistan. 
Neither those American mer-
cantile interests nor the drones 
receive any mention from Kaplan. 
He also forgets that his argument 
for American engagement is suspi-
ciously similar to his argument for 
supporting the Iraq War. The after-
effects of Iraq linger throughout his 
pages, but are explicitly comment-
ed on only once, and in relation to 
the conditions in Pakistan: “Be-
cause Pakistan and its stability had 
figured so prominently in Bush’s 
foreign policy, the lack of improve-
ment here constituted an indict-
ment of his strategy, and an indict-
ment of the diversion of resources 
to Iraq, a war I had supported early 
on”. The significance of what he 
observes, and what he argues for 
in Monsoon cannot be unmoored 
from this compromised position as 
a herald of a false dawn of democ-
racy in Iraq. The only lesson he has 
learnt is to temper his claims for de-
mocracy – he praises military rule 
in Bangladesh as a viable option – 
and to add a note of caution to the 
American power.
Hence, this is a text with a vague 
unease with an unqualified no-
tion of American empire – and to 
clarify here, not an unease with em-
pire itself. This unease is perhaps 
the dominant factor in the largely 
conciliatory gesture Kaplan main-
tains towards China (a state whose 
economy and military are not at par 
with the United States but which 
has shown an intellectual aware-
ness that outsmarts the US). He 
argues that China can easily be con-
sidered a “partner” which can be 
counted on to maintain a precari-
ous balance of power in the Indian 
Ocean. This balance is necessary to 
reintegrate places like Yemen, Paki-
stan, Bangladesh, Zanzibar into the 
global commercial classes and to 
bring closer the two faces of Islam.
The policy readers of this book will 
find it sober reading. The empire, 
which does listen to Robert Kaplan, 
will surely invite him to speak to 
groups with shiny brass and shinier 
domes. The historians reading this 
book will have less cause to be char-
itable. The now-standard collapse 
of lived history from “Alexander the 
Great” to “us” would be laughable if 
it wasn’t so tragic.
Again and again, centuries dis-
appear from Kaplan’s narrative as 
routinely elaborated customs and 
practices are relegated to either 
geographic determinism or some-
thing called “Desert Islam”. Those 
inhabitants of the climes in which 
Kaplan locates his narrative will 
have more than ample reason to be 
offended by his caricatures or by his 
invocations to the healing power of 
violence – be it Robert Clive’s or Sul-
tan Qabus. In this, however, Kaplan 
is neither unique nor exemplary in 
a pantheon of great American com-
mentators which stretch from Tho-
mas L Friedman to Fareed Zakaria. 
The empire requires a particular 
kind of information, alone.
What is more glaringly at stake is 
that nearly eight years after the in-
vasion of Iraq and under a new ad-
ministration in the White House, 
the “debate” of the global war on 
terror remains stuck in the same 
analytical framework as it did in 
2001. Contrasting Robert Kaplan 
from 2010 with Niall Ferguson from 
2001 is an exercise akin to examin-
ing a patient suffering from a fugue 
state – the amnesia is stark and 
starkly present.
Manan Ahmed is a historian of  
Pakistan at Freie Universitat Berlin. 
He blogs at Chapati Mystery.
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